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The  paper  compares  the  recent  economic  liberalization  in  China  and 
India  in  historical  and  cultural  perspective.  It  finds  greater  similarities 
than  differences  in  the  initial  conditions  under  which  the  reforms  were 
begun,  their  motivation  as  well  as  in  their  extent  and  results.  It  also 
speculates  on  the  likely  course  of  reform  in  the  future,  which  in  both 
countries  require  the  dismantling  of  loss-making  state  enterprises.  The 
political  uncertainties  are  underlined,  though  it  is  argued  that  Indian 
reforms  may  now  be  irreversible,  unlike  China,  because  of  a  more  marked 
change  in  cultural  attitudes,  which  has  created  a  greater  popular  consensus 
for  markets  over  mandarins. 
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Judging  from  reports  in  the  press,  the  1990s  is  going  to  be  the  era  of 
economic  liberalization  of  the  two  great  Asian  giants  India  and  China,  which 
together  account  for  over  2  billion  of  the  world's  5.3  billion  people.  If 
the  economic  reforms  underway  are  successfully  completed,  these  countries 
could  repeat  the  growth  miracles  of  much  smaller  Asian  economies,  and  like 
them  should  be  able  to  eliminate  mass  poverty.  This  would  indeed  be  the 
Great  Transformation.  But  will  the  countries  stay  the  course,  and  complete 
what  judging  from  Latin  American  experience  (e.g.,  in  Chile  and  Mexico)  can 
be  an  arduous  journey  through  many  rocky  shoals,  and  which  could  take  over  a 
decade.  Again  from  press  reports  as  well  as  the  assessments  of  various 
bankers  appraising  so-called  emergent  markets  it  would  seem  that  whereas 
there  is  no  doubt  about  China's  ability  to  continue  with  what  on  paper 
emerges  as  its  spectacular  growth  since  the  initiation  of  reforms  at  the  end 
of  the  197Os,  the  chances  of  India  successfully  unshackling  its  repressed 
economy  are  less  bright.  The  main  difference  being  in  the  differing  politi- 
cal  pressures  impinging  on  the  reformers  in  the  two  countries.  In  assessing 
the  cultural  context  and  political  constraints  on  liberalizing  India's 
economy  --  the  subject  of  this  conference  --  it  may  be  useful,  therefore,  to 
hold  up  China  as  a  mirror  to  see  whether  these  currently  fashionable 
judgments  are  valid. 
In  the  comparative  task  I  undertake  in  this  paper,  there  are,  however, 
two  important  caveats  that  the  reader  should  bear  in  mind.  First,  whereas  I 
have  spent  much  of  my  professional  life  working  on  the  past  and  present  of 
the  Indian  economy,  I  can  claim  to  be  no  more  than  a  casual  China  watcher. 
Most  of  the  generalizations  and  judgments  made  about  China  therefore  remain 
open  to  much  more  serious  doubt  in  my  mind  than  those  concerning  India. 
Secondly,  the  differences  in  the  comparative  statistical  bases  of  forming some  objective  judgment  about  economic  performance  in  the  two  countries  are 
so  marked  that  even  the  most  basic  questions  concerning  the  size  and  growth 
of  national  income  and  population  in  China  cannot  be  answered  with  any  great 
certainty,  as  compared  with  India.  (We  take  this  question  up  in  greater 
detail  when  we  try  to  form  judgments  on  relative  performance.)  Having  made 
two  visits  to  China  (in  1985,  and  1993)  and  after  talking  to  her  officials 
and  academics,  one  might  feel  that  reasonable  judgments  might  be  possible. 
But  one  only  has  to  remember  the  judgments  made  by  other  travellers  to  China 
in  the  1960s  and  1970s  to  know  that  appearances  can  be  deceptive.  One  would 
hate  to  be  merely  a  different  type  of  fellow  traveller! 
Bearing  these  caveats  in  mind  we  can  proceed  to  our  comparative  task. 
This  is  done  in  3  parts.  The  first  sets  out  the  initial  conditions  in  the 
. 
0  two  countries  at  their  "independence"  in  the  late  194Os,  their  respective 
development  strategies  and  economic  outcomes.  The  second  attempts  to  delin- 
eate  the  reasons  for  reform  and  the  stages  it  has  followed  and  what  the 
outcome  has  been  in  the  two  countries.  The  third  tries  to  peer  into  the 
future,  by  attempting  to  answer  the  rhetorical  question  which  forms  the 
subtitle  of  the  paper. 
I.  DIRIGISME 
There  are  some  striking  similarities  in  the  economic  history  of  the  two 
giant  Asian  economies  both  in  the  more  distant  and  recent  past. 
Both  countries  were  marked  at  "independence"  in  the  1940s  by  centuries 
of  cultural  stability  and  economic  stagnation  --  the  subtitle  of  my  m 
Hindu  Eauilibrium  (on  China  see  Elvin).  The  stagnation  was  in  per  capita 
income,  so  that  with  the  relatively  modest  population  growth  of  the  past 
there  was  extensive  growth  (in  Lloyd  Reynolds  felicitous  phrase)  but  no 
obvious  signs  of  intensive  growth  --  which  leads  to  a  secular  increase  in per  capita  income.  This  in  turn  was  due  in  large  part  to  both  countries 
having  made  near  perfect  adaptations  to  the  environments  in  which  their 
respective  "organic"  economies  had  been  placed.  An  "organic"  economy  is 
defined  by  Wrigley  as  "an  economy  bounded  by  the  productivity  of  land"  (p. 
5).  In  such  an  economy  --  and  historically  this  has  been  the  dominant  type 
over  the  globe  --  there  is  a  universal  dependence  on  organic  raw  materials 
for  food,  clothing,  housing  and  fuel.  Their  supply  is  in  the  long  run 
inevitably  constrained  by  the  fixed  factor  --  land.  This  was  also  true  of 
traditional  industry  and  transport.  Most  metal  working  industries  were 
dependent  upon  charcoal  (a  vegetable  substance)  for  smelting  and  working 
crude  ores.  Hence  in  an  organic  economy,  once  the  land  frontier  is  reached, 
diminishing  returns  will  take  their  inexorable  toll. 
Both  India  and  China  had  succeeded,  by  the  middle  ages,  in  creating 
economies  which  maintained  what  Elvin  calls  a  "high  equilibrium  trap"  (for 
India  see  La1  (1988)),  which  yielded  an  average  level  of  living  for  their 
peoples  which  was  the  envy  of  the  world  at  the  time.  But  this  was  achieved 
through  different  forms  of  cultural  stability  and  political  organization. 
These  differences  in  part  reflected  the  differing  ethnic  compositions  of  the 
two  countries.  Whereas  India  has  been  a  multi-ethnic  society  par  excellence 
for  millennia,  China  has  been  ethnically  homogenous  to  a  remarkable  degree. 
Secondly,  whereas  political  instability  has  been  the  norm  in  India,  China 
has  shown  a  remarkable  political  unity  under  centralized  imperial  rule  for 
millennia.  These  differences  did  not  however  prevent  the  emergence  of  rela- 
tively  stable  Revenue  economies  (Hicks),  and  what  I  call  predatory  states 
(LA  (1988)  Ch.  13.2)  in  both  countries.  The  main  cultural  and  political 
differences  were:  the  decentralized  form  of  social  control  as  embodied  in 
the  Indian  caste  system,  and  the  relatively  autarkic  village  communities,  in a  polity  which  has  usually  been  regionally  fragmented  and  only  rarely 
encompassed  the  subcontinent  under  Imperial  rule  (La1  (1988));  compared  with 
the  more  centralized  social  control  in  an  absolutist  state  --  in  a 
relatively  integrated  national  market  --  run  by  Confucian  mandarins  in 
China,  "which  has  remained  united  politically  from  Sung  to  modern  times  with 
only  relatively  brief  periods  of  disruption  between  regimes"  (McNeil1  p.  49) 
when  the  Mandate  of  Heaven  was  transferred  from  one  dynasty  to  the  next. 
However,  neither  India  or  China  could  escape  from  their  "high 
equilibrium  trap"  without  moving  as  the  West  did  from  an  "organic"  to  a 
mineral  based  energy  economy,  whose  productivity  is  no  longer  bounded  by  the 
fixed  factor  of  production  --  land.  Its  centerpiece  was  the  utilization  of 
the  capital  stock  of  stored  energy  represented  by  fossil  fuels,  in  particu- 
lar  coal,  through  the  development  of  the  steam  engine,  which  provided  (r 
virtually  unlimited  supplies  of  mechanical  energy.  "The  prospects  for 
growth  both  in  the  aggregate  output  and  in  output  per  head  were  entirely 
transformed  from  those  which  had  previously  obtained"  (Wrigley,  pp.  5-6). 
Secular  intensive  growth  which  could  eradicate  mass  poverty  had  become 
feasible.  This  was  different,  qualitatively,  from  the  type  of  intensive 
growth  that  Adam  Smith  had  shown  could  be  generated  even  within  an  organic 
economy,  through  the  replacement  of  the  mercantilist  system  by  his  form  of 
"capitalism"  and  free  trade.  But  the  land  constraint  would  always  still 
remain  binding. 
Whereas  for  India  there  is  little  historical  evidence  of  intensive 
growth  of  either  type  occurring  before  the  modern  era,  for  China  there  is 
evidence  that  the  Smithian  variety  occurred  in  Sung  China,  and  that  all  the 
technological  ingredients  were  present  for  the  emergence  of  the  technologic- 
ally  determined  variety.  Thus  McNeil1  summing  up  the  effects  of  the commercialization  and  national  integration  of  the  economy  under  the  Sung, 
states:  "proliferating  market  exchanges  --  local,  regional,  and  trans- 
regional  --  allowed  spectacular  increases  in  total  productivity,  as  all  the 
advantages  of  specialization  that  Adam  Smith  later  analyzed  so  persuasively 
came  into  operation"  (p.  29).  (Also  see  Jones,  Chp.  4.)  Whilst  Hartwell's 
work  (cited  in  McNeill,  p,  26)  shows  that  the  Chinese  by  the  11th  century 
had  coke  fired  blast  furnaces  for  producing  iron  and  steel,  and  had  been 
using  coke  for  heating  and  cooking  for  200  years  before  this  (p.  49).  But 
they  failed  to  develop  the  steam  engine  which  could  have  harnessed  this 
fossil  fuel  to  provide  the  mechanical  energy  which  would  have  broken  the 
limits  to  intensive  growth  set  by  land.  This  was  despite  the  fact  that  as 
Needham  notes  (pp.  96-7)  they  had  developed  all  the  ingredients  which  were 
-  required  for  its  development.  The  subsequent  stagnation  of  the  Chinese 
economy  despite  this  medieval  creativity  is  one  of  the  great  historical 
puzzles,  which  goes  beyond  the  remit  of  this  paper.  But  there  is  one  set  of 
explanations  which  is  relevant  because  of  its  contemporary  resonance. 
McNeill,  Jones,  and  Lin  for  instance  all  relate  the  so-called  Needham 
problem  to  the  creation  of  the  Confucian  mandarinate,  which  was  charged  with 
implementing  the  "official  doctrine  [which]  held  that  the  emperor  'should 
consider  the  Empire  as  if  it  formed  a  single  household'"  (McNeill,  p.  31). 
This  household  following  Confucian  values  despised  both  soldiers  and 
merchants.  The  mandarinate's  task  was  to  manage  both,  recognizing  that  both 
were  needed  to  maintain  the  physical  integrity  of  the  Empire.  "Systematic 
restraint  upon  industrial  expansion,  commercial  expansion,  and  military 
expansion  were  built  into  the  Chinese  system  of  political  administration" 
(P.  40).  The  market  increased  the  economy's  flexibility,  and  the  resulting 
new  wealth  and  improved  communications  enhanced  the  practical 
power  Chinese  officials  had  at  their  disposal.  . . .  Discrepancies between  the  ideals  of  the  marketplace  and  those  of  government  were 
real  enough;  but  as  long  as  officials  could  bring  overriding  pol- 
ice  power  to  bear  whenever  they  were  locally  or  privately  defied, 
the  command  element  in  the  mix  remained  securely  dominant  . . .  in 
every  encounter  the  private  entrepreneur  was  at  a  disadvantage, 
while  officials  had  the  whip  hand.  This  was  so,  fundamentally, 
because  most  Chinese  felt  that  the  unusual  accumulation  of  private 
wealth  from  trade  or  manufactures  was  profoundly  immoral  . . . 
official  ideology  and  popular  psychology  thus  coincided  to 
reinforce  the  advantage  officials  had  in  any  and  every  encounter 
with  merely  private  men  of  wealth.  (McNeill,  pp.  50-l) 
Whether  these  attitudes  have  continued  till  today  will  be  an  important 
determinant  of  the  future  of  the  current  economic  liberalization  in  China. 
But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Communist  system  under  which  China  sought  to 
promote  the  modern  form  of  intensive  growth  probably  strengthened  these 
traditional  attitudes. 
Similar  atavistic  attitudes  to  trade  and  commerce  were  also  present  in 
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India,  and  were  accentuated  by  the  Fabianism  adopted  by  most  of  its  Western-  * 
ized  political  and  bureaucratic  classes  (La1  (1988)).  Not  surprisingly, 
therefore,  they  too  found  the  Soviet  model  resonant  in  their  drive  for 
industrialization  --  though  in  the  softer  tones  associated  with  a  democracy. 
The  resulting  industrial  policy  framework  was  also  by  and  large  similar  as 
both  countries  followed  hot  house  industrialization  through  the  promotion  of 
heavy  industry  under  the  aegis  of  state  enterprises.  Both  followed 
relatively  autarkic  trade  policies  accompanied  by  a  battery  of  trade  and 
exchange  controls,  which  progressively  cut  any  link  between  domestic  and 
world  relative  prices.  This  had  well-known  deleterious  effects  on  the 
economy's  efficiency  and  thence  productivity.  Both  also  systematically 
discriminated  against  agriculture  by  taxing  it  directly  or  indirectly.  But 
this  policy  went  much  further  in  China  during  the  Maoist  Great  Leap  Forward 
and  the  establishment  of  communes.  This  was  a  disaster.  It  led  to  one  of 
the  worst  famines  in  human  history,  and  set  back  Chinese  agricultural productivity  for  a  decade.  This  policy  was  completely  reversed  by  the 
establishment  of  the  "household  responsibility  system"  in  the  late  1970s. 
By  contrast  India  switched  in  the  late  1960s  towards  various  policies  to 
promote  agriculture,  which  led-in  ecologically  suitable  parts  of  the  country 
--  to  what  is  termed  the  Green  Revolution. 
From  the  late  197Os,  moreover,  both  countries  have  been  gradually 
trying  to  escape  from  the  dirigiste  system  of  controls  of  trade  and  foreign 
industry  that  they  had  previously  set  up.  We  need  to  briefly  outline  the 
consequences  of  this  dirigisme,  which  might  provide  reasons  for  this  move  to 
liberalization,  which  is  discussed  in  the  next  section, 
A  comparison  of  the  relative  performance  of  the  two  giant  Asian 
economies  is  bedeviled  by  statistical  problems  relating  to  estimates  of 
Chinese  GDP  and  population.  By  contrast  Indian  national  income  figures  and  * 
population  data  are  much  more  secure.  The  problems  with  the  Chinese  data 
mm which  have  sadly  been  used  even  by  reputable  international  organizations 
like  the  World  Bank  --  can  be  readily  highlighted  by  looking  at  the  implica- 
tions  of  the  World  Bank  estimates  of  per  capita  GNP  and  its  growth  rate 
between  1965-1990  in  India  and  China.  According  to  the  World  Bank  (1992, 
World  DeveloDment  Indicators,  Table  1)  the  average  rate  of  growth  of  per 
capita  income  was  5.8%  for  China  and  1.9%  for  India  over  this  period.  The 
level  of  per  capita  income  in  1990  was  $370  for  China  and  $350  for  India. 
These  figures  imply  that  per  capita  incomes  in  China  in  1965  could  only  have 
been  41%  of  India's.  As  Srinivasan  rightly  comments: 
No  knowledgeable  analyst  of  the  two  countries  would  subscribe  to 
this  relative  value  of  China's  GNP  per  capita  in  1965!  A 
plausible  explanation  for  these  paradoxical  figures  is  that  the 
figure  of  $370  in  1990  as  China's  per  capita  GNP  reflects  the 
consideration  that  a  more  realistic  figure  might  soon  make  China 
ineligible  for  loans  from  IDA,  the  soft  loan  affiliate  of  the 
World  Bank.  (P.  5) (Also  see  Lardy,  Appendix  B.)  Nor  has  the  scholarly  discussion  reached  any 
measure  of  agreement  (see  Rawski,  Ma  and  Garnaut,  Kumar).  For  the  base 
period,  1950,  the  most  plausible  inference  is  Kumar's:  "The  per  capita 
income  of  both  India  and  China  was  very  low  in  1949  and  given  the  margin  of 
error,  it  is  not  worth  arguing  about  which  country  was  the  poorer"  (p.  30). 
Furthermore  the  distortions  in  the  Chinese  relative  price  structure  where 
there  were  few  links  between  prices  and  the  respective  marginal  rates  of 
substitution  in  consumption  or  of  transformation  in  production,  make  any 
inferences  of  Chinese  productive  capacity  or  welfare  from  its  GNP  at  domes- 
tic  prices  highly  dubious.  Purchasing  power  parity  estimates  of  Chinese  GDP 
have  however  been  made  by  Heston  et  al.,  and  by  Maddison,  and  are  summarized 
in  Table  1.  Given  all  the  problems  surrounding  the  basic  data  and  the  price 
comparisons  made,  these  can  at  best  provide  broad  orders  of  magnitude,  and 
of  the  two,  in  my  judgment,  the  Maddison  estimates  ring  truer! 
These  problems  of  estimating  Chinese  GDP  are  compounded  by  problems  in 
estimating  its  population.  The  only  proper  censuses  in  China  were  in  1982 
and  1990.  All  earlier  estimates  are  based  on  partial  surveys.  Moreover  the 
numbers  emerging  from  the  recent  1990  census  are  marred  by  the  under-report- 
ing  of  female  births  due  to  the  "one  child"  population  policy  (see  Zeng  Yi 
et  al.) 
So  what  can  we  conclude  on  relative  performance?  It  would  appear  that 
till  the  late  1970s  China  grew  faster  than  India.  This  was  largely  due  to 
differences  in  the  rates  of  growth  of  industry.  The  rate  of  growth  of  agri- 
cultural  output  was  about  the  same.  In  China  between  1952-78  (before  the 
introduction  of  the  household  responsibility  system)  it  was  2.9%,  in  India 
between  1950  and  1986  it  was  2.6%;  whilst  grain  output  grew  at  2.4%  in  China 
and  2.6%  in  India  (Srinivasan,  p.  20).  But  the  performance  of  both  was  well TABLE  1 
Comparative  Growth  Performance 
Growth  Rates, 
GDP 
(A)  Heston  et  al..  Estimates 
CHINA  1960-73  4.6 
1973-80  5.3 
1980-88  9.2 
INDIA  1960-73  2.5 
1973-80  2.3 
1980-88  5.0 
NOTE:  POP  column  derived  from  Heston  et  al.,  estimates 















as  GDP-GDP/POP 
Per  Capita  Growth  Rates 
GDP  (%  p.a.> 
GDP/POP  ($1  GDP/POP  GDP 
(B)  Maddison  Estimates 
CHINA  1950  415  2.76  5.06 
1973  774  3.46  5.06 
INDIA  1950  399 
1973  513  1.08  3.38 
1987  662  1.06  3.27 
NOTE:  Growth  rate  figures  are  derived  from  Maddison's  estimates  of 
GDP/POP($),  and  from  POP  in  (A)). 10 
below  that  of  the  Asian  NIC's  in  terms  of  industrialization  and  other 
developing  countries  (e.g.,  Kenya,Indonesia  and  Pakistan)  in  terms  of 
agricultural  growth.  Reported  social  indicators  appear  to  be  better  in 
China  than  India,  but  the  overall  level  of  inequality,  particularly  in  rural 
areas  was  about  the  same  (the  Gini  coefficient  was  0.31  in  1979  for  rural 
China  and  0.34  in  rural  India  in  1973-76  (World  Bank  (1983),  Table  3.19). 
"Though  the  same  sources  report  a  somewhat  higher  inequality  in  urban  income 
distribution  in  India,  because  of  the  large  weight  of  rural  areas  in  both 
countries  overall  income  distribution  was  roughly  similar"  (Srinivasan,  p. 
18).  Despite  different  political  systems,  the  overall  performance  of  the 
two  economies  in  their  dirigiste  post-independence  phases  was  thus  not  too 
dissimilar  --  in  particular  well  below  their  respective  potential! 
II.  REFORM 
In  discussing  reforms  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  the  policy 
induced  distortions  created  by  irrational  dirigisme  in  commodity  and  factor 
markets. 
China  has  suffered  from  marked  distortions  in  all  of  these  markets. 
Its  complete  delinking  between  world  and  domestic  prices  until  the  early 
198Os,  the  reluctance  to  change  the  controlled  prices  that  were  set  in  the 
early  days  of  planning  in  the  195Os,  and  the  comprehensive  control  of  trade 
and  foreign  exchange  through  state  monopolies  meant  that  no  economic  ration- 
ality  could  be  adduced  to  the  resulting  domestic  price  structure.  Though 
India  too  had  many  distortions  in  its  domestic  price  structure,  they  were 
never  likely  to  have  reached  the  Chinese  extreme.  In  both  cases  the 
dirigiste  system  systematically  discriminated  against  exports.  In  the 
relatively  more  open  "mixed"  Indian  economy  this  resulted  in  periodic 
balance  of  payments  crises,  one  of  which  in  1966  led  to  the  first  abortive 11 
attempt  at  liberalizing  the  external  sector.  From  then  on,  there  were  long 
drawn  out  and  convoluted  attempts  to  remove  the  bias  against  exports  through 
various  forms  of  indirect  subsidization  of  exports.  These  did  have  the 
effect  of  providing  some  modest  boost  to  exports.  This  process  of  trade 
liberalization  was  supplemented  by  some  easing  of  industrial  licensing  and 
fiscal  reform  in  Rajiv  Gandhi's  early  administration.  But  many  of  the 
promised  reforms  of  the  foreign  trade  system  (replacing  QR's  by  tariffs), 
and  the  public  sector  ("easing  exit  of  unviable  units"  Economic  Survey 
1985-6)  remained  merely  plans,  as  the  government  became  embroiled  in  the 
Bofors  scandal  and  reform  was  put  on  the  back  burner.  It  was  not  till  the 
macroeconomic  crisis  of  1991  forced  India  into  the  arms  of  the  World  Bank 
and  the  IMF  that  a  more  serious  attempt  at  liberalization  was  undertaken. 
. 
This  crisis  which  threatened  international  bankruptcy  for  India,  and  0 
the  response  to  it,  was  a  replay  of  dramas  enacted  in  many  parts  of  Latin 
America  in  the  1980s.  I  have  charted  the  anatomy  of  this  cycle  of  economic 
repression  --  macroeconomic  crisis  --  reform  elsewhere,  in  greater  detail 
(La1  (1987,  1993),  La1  and  Myint).  Two  points,  however,  which  are  relevant 
for  my  present  purposes  may  be  noted.  First  these  crises  are  fiscal  crises 
caused  by  the  unsustainability  of  the  vast  system  of  politically  determined 
entitlements  to  income  streams  created  by  past  dirigisme  in  the  micro- 
economy.  Second  they  arise  when  all  possible  means  of  financing  them  seem 
to  be  at  an  end.  One  means  is  through  taxation.  But  tax  revenues  are  less 
than  buoyant  both  because  growth  has  been  damaged  by  the  productivity 
damaging  effects  of  dirigisme,  and  because  of  the  inescapable  rise  of  the 
"black"  economy  as  more  and  more  seek  to  escape  the  taxed  economy.  With 
entitlements  growing,  at  some  stage  a  fiscal  deficit  will  emerge.  This  can 
only  be  financed  by  three  means:  internal  or  external  borrowing  or  the 12 
levying  of  the  inflation  tax.  Given  underdeveloped  domestic  capital 
markets,  internal  borrowing  is  limited.  So  the  usual  option  is  to  increase 
foreign  borrowing.  India  did  this,  and  in  an  echo  of  China  (but  with 
important  differences  in  the  form)  tried  to  tap  the  riches  of  its  worldwide 
diaspora  (the  non-resident  Indians-NRIs).  But  as  in  Latin  America  this 
capital  inflow  was  short  term  and  hence  volatile.  With  the  continuing 
political  instability  and  little  sign  of  improvement  in  the  productivity  and 
hence  capacity  to  repay  of  the  economy,  these  investors  are  at  some  stage 
likely  to  take  fright.  This  leaves  only  the  inflationary  tax.  But  this  too 
is  unsustainable,  as  economic  agents  take  countervailing  action  --  in  a 
democracy  as  inflation  shy  as  the  Indian,  also  through  the  ballot  box.  The 
ensuing  crisis  appears  as  a  balance  of  payments  and  fiscal  crisis,  and  it 
provides  a  small  window  of  opportunity  for  radical  reform.  This,  at  the  * 
most  basic  level  involves  rescinding  all  the  politically  determined  entitle- 
ments  created  by  dirigisme  -and  therein  lies  the  rub.  For  the  losers 
already  know  who  they  are,  whilst  the  gainers  from  the  increased  productiv- 
ity  which  results  from  liberalization  are  potential,  i.e.,  unknown.  For 
this  reason  I  have  been  an  advocate  of  a  "big  bang"  when  a  crisis  presents 
an  opportunity  for  reform. 
India,  faut  mieux,  did  not  follow  this  apparently  politically  risky 
course  for  a  minority  government.  Besides  success  in  macroeconomic  stabil- 
ization  it  made  some  headway  in  dismantling  the  mercantilist  system  of 
industrial  licensing,  price  controls  and  trade  and  exchange  controls.  But 
it  failed  to  rescind  one  of  the  major  entitlements  --  secure  jobs  in  the 
loss-making  public  enterprises,  and  the  bloated  bureaucracies  in  State  and 
central  governments,  in  para-statals  and  the  nationalized  banking  sector. 
With  the  passions  aroused  by  the  Ayodhya  issue,  and  the  accompanying 13 
political  reverberations,  the  reform  process  seems  to  be  stalled.  Specula- 
tions  about  its  future  are  left  to  the  next  section. 
Of  the  factor  markets  --  the  land  market  (most  of  which  is  rural)  has 
been  virtually  free  in  India.  The  major  factor  market  distortions  are  in 
the  market  for  labor  in  the  so-called  organized  sector,  and  in  the  capital 
market  through  the  workings  of  the  nationalized  banking  sector. 
China,  by  contrast,  had  severe  distortions  in  all  its  factor  markets  in 
addition  to  those  in  the  commodity  market.  Its  land  market  was  extinguished 
with  collectivization.  The  practice  of  assigning  jobs  bureaucratically  for 
life  to  urban  workers,  together  with  in  effect  strict  controls  of  migration, 
froze  the  labor  market.  Whilst  in  the  command  economy  of  a  Communist 
country  there  was  clearly  no  place  for  a  capital  market.  Factor  markets 
require  some  delineation  of  property  rights  to  exist.  Under  Chinese  commun- 
ism  with  everyone  a  ward  of  a  State  which  had  socialized  all  property  -- 
including  individual  labor  --  there  could  be  no  factor  markets! 
But  the  extinguishing  of  land  and  labor  markets  in  Chinese  agriculture 
also  led  to  a  rapid  denouement.  With  the  establishment  of  the  communes 
during  the  Great  Leap  Forward,  as  Li  Xiannian  is  reported  to  have  told  one 
visitor:  "the  peasants  simply  downed  tools  and  turned  their  bottoms  to  the 
sun"  (cited  in  Evans,  p.  250)!  The  resulting  famine  was  the  worst  in  the 
world  in  this  century.  The  setback  to  agricultural  output  and  productivity 
was  not  reversed  till  the  household  responsibility  system  restored  virtual 
private  property  rights  in  land  (see  Cheung  (1990)).  Total  factor  product- 
ivity  in  agriculture  did  not  reach  its  1952  level  till  1983  (Lin  (1990)  p. 
1246). 
The  start  of  the  Chinese  reform  process  is,  thus,  rightly  identified 
with  the  rural  reforms.  They  began  with  the  partial  dismantlement  of  the 14 
communes  in  1962,  but  did  not  reach  fruition  till  the  household  based  farm- 
ing  system  was  established  in  1979.  Their  impetus  was  one  of  the  important 
historical  lessons  of  China's  thousand  year  history  of  dynastic  transitions 
--  the  link  between  food  production  and  political  and  social  stability. 
"This  political  wisdom  is  capsuled  in  an  often  cited  motto  'wu  nong  bu  wen' 
(without  a  strong  agriculture,  the  society  will  not  be  stable)  in  the 
agriculture  policy  debates  in  China"  (Lin  (1990a)  p.  151).  The  results  were 
dramatic. 
The  growth  rate  of  grain  in  1952-78  was  2.4  percent  per  year,  only 
0.4  percent  above  the  population  growth  rate.  The  per  capita 
availability  of  grain,  therefore,increased  only  10  percent  over  a 
quarter  of  a  century.  . . .  Between  1979-84,  agricultural  output  and 
grain  output,  respectively,  grew  at  11.8  percent  and  4.1  percent 
annually  while  population  grew  at  1.3  percent  in  the  same  period. 
Although  agriculture  as  a  whole  still  grew  at  a  respectable  rate 
of  4.1%  p.a.  after  1984,  grain  production  has,  nevertheless,  stag- 
nated  after  reaching  a  peak  of  407  million  tons  in  1984.  ,..  The 
main  reason  was  the  failure  of  the  government  to  implement  a 
market-oriented  price  reform  for  grain.  (Lin,  pp.  150-l) 
What  this  suggests  is  that,  the  marked  rise  in  the  post-1979  Chinese 
growth  rate  was  largely  the  result  of  making  up  ground  after  the  disaster  of 
the  Great  Leap  Forward.  Its  basis  was  the  household  responsibility  cont- 
ract,  which  "comes  very  close  to  what  in  the  Western  world  is  a  grant  of 
private  property  in  land.  The  clear,  if  minor,  departure  is  that  the 
Chinese  version  takes  the  form  of  leasehold  instead  of  fee  simple;  that  is 
the  contract  is  not  in  perpetuity"  (Cheung,  (1990),  p.  23).  Whilst 
informants  during  a  visit  in  1993  informed  me  that  whilst  the  land  cannot  be 
sold  (as  it  belongs  to  the  State),  leases  can  be  transferred  or  sold,  so 
various  forms  of  tenancy  have  arisen  as  the  initial  owners  of  the  lease  move 
to  other  more  lucrative  occupations.  This  privatization  of  land  was  not 
resisted  by  the  cadres  because  they  "often  end[ed]  up  with  several  respons- 
ibility  contracts"  (Cheung  (1986)  p.  66)! 15 
The  liberalization  of  commodity  markets  in  China  began  with  the  partial 
trade  liberalization  of  1972,  following  Nixon's  opening  to  China.  However, 
unlike  the  rural  reforms,  these  were  "motivated  largely  by  geopolitical  and 
strategic  considerations  and  not  by  economic  factors.  Relations  with  the 
West  . . .  were  improved  to  enhance  China's  leverage  vis  a  vis  the  Soviet 
Union  not  because  there  was  a  high  level  political  consensus  that  China 
should  abandon  its  long-time  policy  of  self-sufficiency"  (Lardy,  p.  11). 
The  Cultural  Revolution  which  seems  to  have  caused  more  havoc  to  the  party 
than  the  economy  (see  Evans  (1993)),  set  back  this  process  of  opening  to  the 
West.  But  this  political  theme  was  reasserted  with  Deng  Xiaoping's  victory 
over  the  Gang  of  Four.  The  result  was  that  "between  1978  and  1990  the  aver- 
age  annual  pace  of  trade  expansion  was  in  excess  of  15  percent,  over  three 
times  the  rate  of  growth  of  world  trade"  (Lardy,  p.  11).  This  raised 
China's  share  of  world'exports,  which  had  fallen  from  1.25%  in  1952-55  to 
0.75%  in  1978,  to  2%  in  1991.  By  contrast  India's  share  of  world  exports 
"declined  from  over  2%  in  the  early  1950s  to  stabilize  around  0.5%  in  the 
1980s"  (Srinivasan,  p.  12).  To  put  these  figures  in  perspective  it  may  be 
noted  that  Korea  with  a  population  of  43  million  in  1990  (compared  with  1134 
million  for  China  and  850  million  for  India)  exported  more  (U.S.  $65  bil- 
lion)  than  China  (U.S.  $62  billion)  and  India  (U.S.  $18  billion).  Given  the 
distortions  in  Chinese  GDP  estimates  it  is  much  harder  to  provide  a  firm 
conclusion  of  the  changing  degree  of  openness  of  the  Chinese  as  compared 
with  the  Indian  economy.  Lardy  after  a  detailed  discussion  concludes  that: 
"if  Block's  calculation  of  China's  GDP  in  1980  is  taken  as  meaningful  . . . 
the  trade  ratio  in  China  rose  from  5.8%  in  1978  to  9.4%  by  1988.  If  the 
Summers  and  Heston  estimate  is  taken  as  meaningful,  the  trade  ratio  rose 
from  2.1%  to  3.4%  over  the  same  period"  (p.  154).  Whilst  in  the  earlier 16 
period  if  the  World  Bank  (1983)  is  to  be  believed  the  trade  ratio  in  1980 
was  the  same  as  in  1950.  By  contrast  India,  for  which  the  data  is  more 
secure,  "the  share  of  trade  in  GDP  fluctuated  --  until  the  early  sixties  it 
averaged  over  12%,  only  to  decline  to  a  low  of  less  than  10%  in  the  early 
1970s  and  to  slowly  rise  thereafter  to  about  16%  in  1979-80"  (Srinivasan,  p. 
12). 
From  this  it  appears  that  despite  the  media  hype,  China  remains  more  of 
a  closed  economy  than  India,  and  that  its  "spectacular"  export  performance 
is  only  so  judged  by  a  reference  point  of  near  autarky!  Once  again,  as  in 
agriculture,  an  economy  even  more  highly  repressed  than  India's  has  shown  a 
spectacular  performance  relative  to  its  immediate  past  only  because  of  how 
far  it  lay  inside  its  production  cum  trade  feasibility  frontier. 
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But  this  raises  the  question:  why  is  China's  growth  rate  about  twice 
India's?  The  answer  lies  in  the  rate  of  investment,  which  in  1990  was 
nearly  40%  of  GDP  in  China  as  compared  with  23%  in  India.  There  is  little 
evidence  that  the  productivity  of  investment  (and  changes  in  it  due  to  the 
reforms  that  have  so  far  taken  place)  are  all  that  different  in  the  two 
countries.  Thus  for  China,  according  to  the  World  Bank,  total  factor 
productivity  in  agriculture  and  industry  combined  declined  at  an  annual  rate 
of  -1.  41%  between  1957-  65,  rose  at  only  0.62%  during  1965-76,  and  in  the 
reform  era  (1980-88)  grew  at  2.4%  in  the  state  sector,  4.63%  in  the  collect- 
ive  sector  and  6.44%  in  the  agricultural  sector  (World  Bank  (1992),  Table 
2.3).  Given  the  statistical  difficulties  outlined  earlier  these  cannot  be 
taken  as  hard  figures  but  merely  as  indicating  trends.  For  India  Ahluwa- 
lia's  estimates  for  industry  indicate  that  total  factor  productivity  in 
manufacturing  grew  at  3.4%  in  the  first  half  of  the  1980s  as  compared  with  a 
decline  of  0.3%  per  annum  in  the  previous  15  years. 17 
This  inference  about  the  similarity  in  the  performance  of  the  two 
countries  is  made  more  secure,  if  the  nature  of  the  trade  liberalization 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  two  countries  to  date  is  compared.  Using  the 
phase  methodology  developed  in  the  Bhagwati-Krueger  study  (see  Krueger  for 
details),  Srinivasan  has  categorized  the  past  trade  history  of  India  in 
terms  of  the  following  phases  (where  higher  order  phases  categories  more 
liberalized  trade  and  payments  regimes):  1956-62  (Phase  I);  1962-66  (Phase 
11);  1966-68  (Phase  III);  1968-75  (Phase  II);  1975-85  (Phase  III);  1985-mid 
1991  (Phase  III  continued);  Mid  1991-(Phase  IV?).  For  China  Lardy  argues  in 
a  thorough  analysis  of  its  trade  reforms  that  the  trade  liberalization  that 
has  taken  place  since  the  late  1970s  should  be  taken  as 
reflecting  a  transition  from  a  stage  one  to  a  stage  two 
liberalization  of  an  import  substitution  trade  regime.  .  . .  The 
previous  direct  monopoly  on  all  trade  transactions  exercised  by 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  corresponds  to  Krueger's  stage  one 
in  which  there  is  heavy  reliance  on  quantitative  restrictions. 
Stage  two  is  characterized  by  increasingly  complex  quantitative 
restrictions  rather  than  across  the  board  restrictions  of  phase 
one.  . . .  China's  increasing  use  of  import  duties,  export  subsid- 
ies,  and  other  types  of  price  measures  designed  to  buttress 
quantitative  restrictions  is  also  common  to  phase  two.  (P.  43) 
as  are  the  various  import  entitlement  schemes  based  on  retention  of  foreign 
exchange  which  grew  in  the  1980s.  Given  the  continuing  large  divergences 
between  domestic  and  international  prices  (until  the  1990s)  as  documented  in 
Lardy's  Table  4.2,  it  is  more  than  likely  that  many  of  the  exports  which 
were  privately  profitable  were  not  socially.  Evidence  of  this  exists  for 
India  (see  La1  (1990)).  For  China,  Lardy  believes  this  was  also  the  case 
and  that  "in  at  least  a  few  cases  the  value  added  of  energy  intensive  export 
products  measured  at  international  prices  was  negative"  (p.  96). 
Moreover,  just  as  the  phase  2  and  3  type  reforms  in  India  were 
motivated  less  by  a  conversion  of  the  policymakers  to  the  case  for  free 
trade,  than  by  the  exigencies  of  the  balance  of  payments,  Lardy's  careful 18 
analysis  suggests  that  something  very  similar  lay  behind  the  gradual  trade 
liberalization  in  China  to  date.  In  the  centrally  planned  Chinese  economy, 
with  a  state  monopoly  of  foreign  trade,  there  will  not  be  any  unplanned 
imbalance  between  the  value  of  imports  and  exports  measured  in  foreign 
currency.  However,  because  of  the  separation  between  domestic  and  interna- 
tional  prices  (an  "airlock  system"  according  to  the  World  Bank  (1985)  p. 
97),  characteristic  of  the  Chinese  command  economy  pre  1978,  there  could  be 
a  surplus  or  deficit  on  the  trade  balance  in  domestic  currency  even  when  in 
terms  of  foreign  currency  it  was  in  balance.  As  Lardy  shows  "reforms  of 
China's  foreign  trade  system  frequently  have  been  stimulated  by  the 
occurrence  of  domestic  currency  losses  on  foreign  trade"  (p.  20). 
Both  India  and  China  were  wary  in  the  past  of  private  foreign  capital 
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-  inflows.  An  essential  element  in  their  reform  programs  is  a  reversal  of 
this  policy.  An  important  part  of  the  opening  up  of  China  involved  the 
creation  of  special  economic  zones  in  Southern  China  and  the  active  promo- 
tion  of  direct  foreign  investment  in  joint  ventures.  These  have  largely 
taken  place  with  non-state  enterprises  which  represent  the  extension  of  the 
rural  household  responsibility  system  to  industry.  These  are  so-called 
village,  township  and  collective  enterprises.  They  and  direct  foreign 
investment  has  boomed.  Here  again,  like  India,  China  has  sought  to  mobilize 
the  capital  of  its  international  diaspora  for  its  development.  But  the 
nature  of  the  capital  inflow  has  been  different  because  of  the  differing 
nature  of  the  two  streams  of  migrants.  Whereas  the  Indian  diaspora  (at 
least  of  its  more  affluent  members)  has  largely  consisted  of  the  profession- 
al  classes,  the  Chinese  diaspora,  particularly  to  Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan,  was 
of  entrepreneurs  --  many  of  whom  had  migrated  form  Shanghai  and  Canton  after 
the  Communist  takeover.  Thus  whereas  India  could  at  best  hope  to  mobilize 19 
short  run  capital  inflows  in  the  form  of  bank  deposits  and  bonds,  China  was 
able  to  get  foreign  equity  from  its  diaspora.  Apart  from  the  bundle  of 
entrepreneurship,  technology  and  marketing  this  brings,  it  also  makes  a  debt 
crisis  of  the  Latin  American  variety  less  likely.  On  the  other  hand,  given 
the  large  distortions  in  the  domestic  price  structure,  and  the  accompanying 
large  variance  of  effective  protective  rates,  there  is  likely  to  be  little 
correspondence  between  the  private  and  social  profitability  of  such  direct 
foreign  investment  (see  La1  (1975)). 
The  growth  of  the  non-state  enterprise  sector  in  China,  where  from  all 
accounts  much  of  recent  Chinese  growth  outside  agriculture  has  taken  place, 
has  in  effect  meant  the  growth  of  a  de  facto  private  sector.  But  the 
property  rights  of  the  individuals  who  have  established  these  enterprises 
and  are  seen  to  be  their  de  facto  owners  are  not  recognized  de  iure.  This  - 
is  because  of  the  ideological  imperative  of  preserving  the  fiction  of  state 
ownership  of  assets,  so  that  "private  property  may  be  practiced  in  nature, 
but  not  in  name"  (Cheung  (1990)  p.  25).  This  puts  a  limit  on  the  capitalist 
process  whereby  individual's  rights  to  income  streams  from  capital  can  be 
traded.  This  distortion  in  the  efficient  working  of  the  capital  market 
cannot  be  removed  without  giving  up  the  ideological  fiction  and  converting 
the  de  facto  into  de  iure  private  property  rights  in  the  non-state  sectors. 
This  fortunately  is  not  a  handicap  India  shares  with  China.  But  the 
problems  of  dealing  with  state  enterprises  are  similar.  In  both  countries, 
though  the  forms  differ,  most  state  enterprises  essentially  provide  unviable 
politically  enforced  entitlements  to  future  income  streams  to  their  managers 
and  workers.  In  both  for  political  reasons  there  has  been  a  reluctance  to 
rescind  them.  Instead,  there  is  an  attempt  to  work  around  them  by,  as  it 
were,  building  a  cordon  sanitaire  around  these  enterprises,  and  ensuring 20 
that  the  problem  is  contained  rather  than  reduced  or  eliminated.  The  hope 
is  that  with  the  growth  of  the  rest  of  the  economy,  the  share  and  hence  the 
deadweight  cost  of  these  enterprises  to  the  economy  will  progressively 
decline.  But  in  the  interim,  in  both  countries  they  continue  to  hemorrhage 
the  fist  and  cast  a  shadow  over  the  sustainability  of  the  limited  reforms 
that  are  currently  in  place. 
The  problem  is  particularly  deadly  in  China  because  of  the  Communist 
fiscal  system.  In  the  pre-reform  period,  the  state  enterprises  were  the 
primary  tax  collecting  vehicle  --  as  in  other  communist  countries.  Wong 
describes  this  as  follows: 
The  pre-reform  fiscal  system  in  China  . . .  [had]  overwhelming 
dependence  on  industry,  and  a  reliance  on  profits  of  state-owned 
enterprises,  along  with  taxes  for  government  revenue.  Using 
administrative  prices  that  systematically  discriminate  against 
agricultural  and  raw  materials  producers  in  favor  of  industry, 
artificially  high  profits  are  created  in  the  industrial  sector. 
These  are  then  captured  for  government  coffers  through  a 
combination  of  turnover  taxes  and  expropriation  of  profits. 
(P.  10) 
However,  as  the  process  of  liberalization  proceeds  "effective  property 
rights  devolve  more  to  the  (state-owned)  enterprises  themselves,  and  perhaps 
to  a  narrowly  enfranchised  private  sector.  . . .  By  giving  up  control  over 
state  property,  the  government  in  effect  gives  away  its  tax  base"  (Mckinnon 
(1992)  p.  7).  Furthermore,  even  if  the  government  hangs  onto  its  state 
enterprises,  as  China  has  done,  the  freeing  of  commodity  markets  still 
erodes  the  revenue  base  as: 
First,  the  price  system  can  no  longer  be  rigged  to  keep 
agricultural  procurement  prices  --  and  thus  real  product  wages  -- 
artificially  low  so  as  to  transfer  an  easily  captured  surplus  to 
industry.  Second,  industrial  enterprises  --  owned  by  the  central 
or  diverse  local  governments  that  had  generated  monopoly  profits 
--  may  now  face  substantial  competition  from  each  other  (as 
amongst  township  enterprises  in  China),  from  newly  enfranchised 
private  or  cooperative  enterprises,  and  (possibly)  from  freer 
imports.  The  upshot  is  that  the  industrial  profit  base  itself 
will  tend  to  decline  as  the  monopoly  positions  of  the  old 21 
state-owned  industrial  enterprises  are  undermined. 
(Mckinnon,  p,  7) 
This  is  borne  out  by  Blejer  et  al.  's  estimate  that  the  consolidated  revenue 
of  the  central,  provincial  and  local  governments  in  China  fell  from  34%  of 
GNP  in  1978  to  only  19%  in  1989,  and  most  of  the  fall  was  accounted  for  by  a 
fall  in  "profit  remittances"  from  state-enterprises. 
This  erosion  of  its  traditional  tax  base  has  forced  the  government  to 
in  effect  create  a  form  of  tax  farming-  with  local  governments  contracting 
with  the  center  to  share  revenues  form  local  non-state  industry.  This  has 
greatly  eroded  the  power  of  the  central  government.  With  local  governments 
also  increasingly  concerned  by  the  large  regional  divergences  in  industrial- 
ization  and  in  inflows  of  private  investment,  internal  trade  barriers  to 
bottle  up  domestic  resources  and  to  “protect”  local  factors  of  production  ; 
are  reportedly  growing,  giving  rise  to  fears  (as  one  informant  put  it)  of 
economic  warlordism! 
The  resultant  periodic  macroeconomic  crises  that  have  beset  China  on 
its  path  to  liberalization  have  been  caused  both  by  the  loose  budget  con- 
straint  faced  by  the  state  enterprises  and  their  own  inviability  at 
international  prices.  With  the  domestic  prices  of  90%  of  Chinese  imports 
being  based  on  the  international  price  by  1990  (as  compared  with  43%  in 
1984),  but  with  domestic  export  prices  still  being  relatively  insulated  from 
world  prices,  the  financial  losses  of  the  state  enterprises  have  mounted. 
"In  1990  the  total  of  their  losses  amounted  to  $20  billion,  getting  on  for  5 
percent  of  national  income"  (Evans,  p.  312).  This  has  dire  consequences  for 
macroeconomic  balance. 
The  inflations  that  ensued  were  cured  by  the  traditional  means  of 
monetary  deflation.  This  in  effect  choked  off  credit  to  the  state  enter- 
prises,  which  are  then  unable  to  finance  the  unviable  entitlements  which  the 22 
Chinese  government  is  still  unwilling  to  rescind.  There  is,  thus,  a  built 
in  conflict  between  the  needs  of  liberalization  and  the  desire  to  maintain 
socialist  state  enterprises.  This  is  reflected  in  the  continuing  debate 
between  those  officials  who  seek  "a  return  to  the  system  of  centralized 
foreign  exchange  planning  and  foreign  exchange  control  on  the  one  hand,  and 
more  rapid  movement  toward  convertibility  on  the  other"  (Lardy,  p.  111). 
This  debate  between  the  conservatives  and  the  reformers  was  supposed  to  have 
been  settled  at  the  recent  Central  Committee  meeting.  But  the  Financial 
Times  concluded  that  the  communique  which  was  issued  traded  off  some 
monetary  easing  (desired  by  conservatives  keen  to  preserve  state  enter- 
prises)  for  a  further  commitment  to  deepening  reform  (desired  by  the 
reformers).  It  reflected  "not  a  consensus  but  a  failure  to  a  agree.  . . . 
x 
What  is  lacking  . . .  is  a  willingness  by  central  and  regional  officials  to 
allow  enterprise  to  go  bankrupt,  to  accept  that  richer  provinces  must  pay 
higher  taxes,  and  to  obey  central  bank  directives"  (Financial  Times, 
editorial,  16  Nov.  1993). 
India,  too  despite  its  more  orthodox  and  transparent  macroeconomic 
system  of  control  has  not  been  able  to  tackle  the  problem  of  large  budgetary 
subsidies  for  fertilizers,  energy,  the  public  distribution  system,  and  those 
implicit  in  carrying  loss  making  public  enterprises  and  redundant  labor  in 
the  central  and  state  bureaucracies 
These  continuing  unviable  entitlements  in  both  countries,  are  largely 
related  to  the  labor  market.  In  pre-reform  China,  labor  markets  were  much 
more  rigid  than  in  India,  There  was  little  labor  mobility,  and  the  following 
features  which  still  characterize  state-owned  enterprises  applied  virtually 
to  the  whole  economy  (as  there  were  restrictions  on  rural-urban  and 
inter-regional  migration).  Lardy  notes  that  still  "in  the  state-owned 23 
sector,  most  workers  continued  to  be  assigned  permanent  jobs  when  they 
finished  their  education.  Workers  had  no  right  to  quit  or  leave  their 
assigned  jobs  and  enterprises  had  no  right  to  dismiss  redundant  labor. 
Furthermore,  workers  were  dependent  on  their  work  units  for  their  housing, 
medical  care,  retirement  pensions,  and  a  range  of  other  benefits."  But  with 
the  growth  of  non-state  enterprises,  the  government  has  relaxed  the  require- 
ment  that  all  employment  be  assigned  by  the  state.  This  has  led  --  at  least 
in  Southern  China  --  to  the  virtual  privatization  of  the  labor  market, 
except  for  the  existing  workers  in  state  enterprises  who  maintain  their 
guaranteed  job  security  and  retirement  benefits  (see  Cheung  (1990)  p.  23-4). 
In  India,  the  rigidities  in  the  labor  market  are  largely  confined  to 
the  organized  sector  and  are  based  on  labor  legislation  which  goes  back  to 
m 
the  19th  century,  as  well  as  on  the  implicit  commitment  of  a  job  for  life  in- 
the  government  and  public  enterprises  (see  La1  (1989)).  No  attempt  has  been 
made  in  India  to  rescind  these  entitlements,  As  in  China  the  hope  is  that 
by  allowing  the  rest  of  the  "non-distorted"  economy  to  grow  around  this 
incubus  (which  itself  will  not  be  allowed  to  grow),  its  relative  weight  will 
decline  over  time.  But  given  the  budgetary  implications  of  maintaining 
these  entitlements  in  the  near  future,  it  is  unclear  whether,  in  either 
case,  reform  can  continue  without  some  successful  confrontation  of  these 
deeply  entrenched  vested  interests. 
A  crisis  is  usually  the  ideal  time  to  deal  with  such  deep-seated 
political  problems.  India  has  probably  left  it  too  late  after  its  1991 
crisis  to  deal  with  the  necessary  reform  of  its  labor  market.  The  Chinese 
have  yet  to  experience  a  similar  macroeconomic  crisis.  But  if  the  dynamic 
process  observed  in  other  countries  faced  with  living  with  the  consequences 
of  dirigisme  is  anything  to  go  by,  such  a  crisis  --  which  may  provide  the 24 
Chinese  polity  the  necessary  will  to  deal  with  these  politically  determined 
entitlements  --  may  not  be  too  far  off! 
Given  the  similarities  rather  than  differences  in  the  course  of 
liberalization  and  the  roadblocks  in  its  continuation,  as  well  as  in  the 
pre-reform  "initial"  conditions,  the  similar  effects  --  in  terms  of  some 
boost  in  productivity  and  growth  rates  --  as  reform  progresses,  which  were 
summarized  above,  are  only  to  be  expected! 
III.  FUTURE 
What  of  the  future  of  reform  in  the  two  countries?  Again,  though  the 
current  euphoria  in  the  media  and  financial  circles  about  China,  in  contrast 
with  the  growing  despondency  about  India  --  beset  by  various  ethnic  and 
religious  conflicts  --  might  suggest  that,  the  course  of  reform  is  assured  m 
in  China  but  not  in  India,  appearances  can  once  again  be  deceptive.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  obstacles  in  the  path  of  reform  are  essentially  political  in 
both  cases  --  and  involve  the  dismantling  of  systems  of  unviable  entitle- 
ments,  in  particular  to  organized  labor  and  the  bureaucracy.  It  might 
appear  that  a  dictatorship  committed  to  reform  would  find  it  easier  to  do  so 
than  a  democracy.  But  it  is  this  question  of  commitment  which  is  in 
question  in  both  countries. 
Recently  The  Economist  summarized  the  necessary  conditions  for 
successful  liberalization  that  have  emerged  from  Latin  American  experience 
in  the  catch  phrase,  "commitment,  competence  and  consensus".  This,  it 
argued,  in  Latin  America  involved  "(1)  people  at  the  top  committed  to  it, 
(2)  other  people  technically  qualified  to  implement  it,  (3)  a  national 
trauma,  such  as  hyperinflation,  that  lives  on  in  the  memory  of  voters  as  a 
horror  to  which  they  never  wish  to  return"  (Economist,  Nov.  13,  L.A.  survey, 
p.  14).  Of  these  conditions  the  second  seems  to  be  met,  as  there  are 25 
undoubtedly  competent  technical  teams  in  both  countries  capable  of 
implementing  reform.  It  is  doubts  about  the  first  and  third  conditions 
which  give  one  cause  to  pause  in  both  countries. 
Take  the  condition  regarding  commitment.  What  is  the  degree  of 
commitment  to  reform  of  the  current  leaders  in  the  two  countries?  In  India 
though  there  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  commitment  of  the  Finance  Minister 
Dr.  Manmohan  Singh,  and  to  date  of  the  Prime  Minister  Narasimha  Rao,  the 
same  cannot  be  said  of  the  other  members  of  the  ruling  political  party,  nor 
of  the  major  opposition  parties.  This  is  largely  because  of  the  long  ideo- 
logical  shadow  that,  what  has  been  termed,  "Nehruvianism"  --  a  variant  of 
Fabianism  --  still  casts  on  the  minds  of  the  political  and  intellectual 
classes.  The  press  comments  by  both  ministers  and  many  (but  by  no  means 
I  w 
all)  press  commentators  were  hostile  to  many  of  the  eminently  sensible 
suggestions  made  in  the  July  1993  Bhagwati-Srinivasan  report  commissioned  by 
the  Minister  of  Finance.  The  old  shibboleths  --  maintaining  some  form  of 
socialism  to  help  the  poor,  for  which  the  public  distribution  system  as  well 
as  parts  of  the  public  sector,  and  a  continuing  ban  on  consumer  goods 
imports  are  deemed  essential  --  despite  all  the  countervailing  evidence  (see 
e.g.,  La1  (1988),  Bhagwati(1993))  were  yet  again  on  display.  The  long- 
standing  and  atavistic  Brahminical  disdain  for  commerce  and  trade  was  also 
in  evidence,  as  was  the  continuance  of  a  prickly  nationalism  --  as  some  took 
umbrage  at  an  official  report  written  by  NRI  economists! 
This  nationalism,  however,  provides  some  hope  for  the  future.  One  of 
the  important  themes  of  the  Lal-Myint  comparative  study  is  the  role  of 
"nation-building"  in  explaining  the  rise  of  dirigisme  and  its  reform.  For 
the  dirigisme  which  is  invoked  to  foster  "order",  leads  over  time  to  the 
unintended  consequence  of  breeding  disorder,  as  economic  agents  seek 26 
increasingly  to  escape  the  official  net.  Liberalization  is  then  undertaken 
by  nationalists  to  restore  order  in  what  seem  to  have  become  ungovernable 
economies.  Heckscher's  historical  work  on  mercantilism  provides  an  almost 
exact  parallel  in  this  cycle  of  dirigisme  --  disorder  --  liberalization,  in 
post  Renaissance  Europe.  The  Indian  case  as  I  have  briefly  indicated  in  the 
previous  section  fits  this  thesis.  Hence  if  nationalism  is  still  alive  and 
well  in  India,  it  may  lead  its  adherents  to  see  that  further  liberalization 
is  essential  to  acquire  the  economic  strength  without  which  the  nation  will 
not  be  safe  from  disorder,  originating  from  within  or  without.  The  media 
hype  about  China  has  helped  in  this  context. 
Moreover  there  has  been  a  remarkable  alteration  in  the  climate  of 
public  opinion,  where  the  empowerment  of  the  common  man  against  the  many 
. 
tyrannies  of  the  permit  raj  promised  by  the  reformers,  gladdens  many  middle 
class  hearts  hankering  after  Western  style  consumerism!  Whilst  the 
relatively  shrinking  rewards  from  public  service  as  compared  with  those  in 
the  private  sector  are  persuading  many  of  their  children  to  seek  commercial 
careers.  This  should  help  to  undermine  the  long-standing  Brahminical 
attitudes  against  Banias.  These  cultural  attitudes  which  in  the  past  favor- 
ed  seemingly  selfless  mandarins  over  selfish  markets  have  also  been 
undermined  by  the  contempt  in  which  nearly  all  politicians  and  many 
bureaucrats  --  seen  as  equally  corrupt  --  are  increasingly  held  by  the 
public.  If  both  mandarins  and  markets  are  now  seen  as  "corrupt"  (in  the 
Augustan  sense  --  see  Pocock  (1975),  La1  (1985)),  the  ethical  preference  for 
the  former  is  undermined,  and  the  efficacy  of  the  two  alternatives  in 
promoting  "opulence"  becomes  the  paramount  consideration.  Even  the  partial 
liberalization  that  has  so  far  taken  place  may  have  helped  to  strengthen 
this  shift  in  attitudes  towards  the  market.  One  straw  in  the  wind  is  the 27 
very  different  reaction  that  Prime  Minister  V.P.  Singh's  desire  to  implement 
the  Mandal  Report  on  caste  reservations  in  government  jobs  evoked  from  the 
Universities  compared  with  the  virtual  silence  that  greeted  the  Rao  govern- 
ment's  actual  implementation  of  the  report  on  instructions  from  the  Supreme 
Court.  Some  commentators  in  India  have  suggested  that  with  the  liberaliza- 
tion  undertaken  in  1991,  job  prospects  in  the  private  sector  look  much 
brighter  to  the  upper  caste  young  than  in  the  public  sector,  so  the  policy 
of  reservations  is  of  lesser  relevance  to  their  future! 
Against  these  hopeful  signs  are  more  dire  ones  --  based  on  interest. 
The  major  potential  losers  from  the  reform  are  businesses  in  previously 
protected  sectors,  and  the  bureaucracy.  The  interlocking  interests  of  the 
politicians,  industrialists  and  bureaucrats  in  perpetuating  the  rents 
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0  generated  by  the  Permit  Raj  which  financed  politics,  are  well  known.  An 
alternative  source  of  electoral  finance  is  still  not  in  place;  without  it, 
the  continuing  commitment  of  Indian  politicians  to  economic  liberalization 
must  remain  questionable.  Whilst  the  losers  amongst  the  businessmen  are 
already  grouping  together  and  lobbying  for  more  gradual  reforms  as  well  as 
various  concessions  to  allow  them  to  play  on  an  "equal  playing  field"  with 
foreign  investors.  Implicit  threats  are  being  made  that  they  might  finance 
the  BJP  which  has  played  the  populist  anti-foreign  card,  and  argued  for 
internal  liberalization  with  no  (or  little)  liberalization  of  foreign  trade 
and  direct  foreign  investment.  Interestingly  though,  the  newer  business 
groups  (e.g.,  the  Ambanis)  have  lobbied  for  a  faster  process  of  liberaliza- 
tion  as  they  unlike  their  older  brethren  feel  they  can  compete  in  global 
markets. 
The  most  recalcitrant  group  is  likely  to  be  the  bureaucrats.  It  is  not 
the  production  workers  in  public  sector  enterprises  who  are  the  problem  -- 28 
they  can  be  pensioned  off  through  the  National  Renewal  fund.  It  is  the 
white  collar  bureaucracy,  numbering  in  the  millions.  They  all  seek  the  job 
security,  perks  and  perquisites  of  the  All  India  services,  and  seek  like 
them  to  enlarge  the  base  of  their  respective  job  pyramids  so  that  there  are 
more  worthwhile  jobs  on  top.  In  the  traditional  Indian  casteist  framework 
they  want  to  protect  not  merely  their  incomes  but  status!  They  include  not 
only  the  officers  but  also  the  karamchari  unions  in  nationalized  banks, 
para-statals,  and  the  central  and  state  governments.  The  government  has  not 
tackled  the  thorny  issue  that  a  large  number  of  them  will  have  to  be  made 
redundant,  in  the  interests  of  both  economic  efficiency  and  the  fist.  The 
example  of  the  DGTD,  whose  functions  became  redundant  with  the  ending  of 
industrial  licensing,  does  not  augur  well  for  the  future.  Evidently,  even 
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though  redundant,  the  officers  of  the  DGTD  still  come  to  their  offices  even  * 
when  there  is  no  work  for  them,  and  continue  to  draw  their  pay  and 
perquisites! 
There  are  clearly  many  rocks  ahead  in  the  path  of  Indian  economic 
reforms.  The  technical  competence  is  there,  and  I  have  argued  that  there  is 
also  a  general  consensus  in  the  country  for  reform,  but  the  commitment  of 
the  politicians  and  hence  the  credibility  of  the  reforms  must  still  remain 
in  doubt. 
What  of  China?  Here  I  can  do  no  more  than  speculate  on  the  basis  of 
what  little  we  know  of  the  inner  workings  of  the  Chinese  government.  Unlike 
India  there  would  seem  (at  least  as  long  as  Deng  Xiaoping  is  alive)  that 
those  committed  to  reform  in  the  Chinese  polity  will  remain  on  top,  purely 
because  Deng  has  repeatedly  reiterated  his  continuing  support  for  reform. 
This  raises  the  question  of  why  Deng  supported  liberalization  and  how  if  at 
all  he  envisages  it  to  proceed.  A  few  clues  are  provided  in  a  recent 29 
biography  by  a  former  U.K.  Ambassador  to  China  (Evans  (1993)).  Three  themes 
emerge.  Deng  as  a  passionate  nationalist,  secondly  a  man  keen  on  preserving 
the  Communist  party,  and  the  morale  of  its  members  and  thirdly,  a  socialist 
for  whom  socialism  "was  associated  with  prosperity  . . .  [and  who]  was  ready 
to  try  a  wide  variety  of  means  in  the  quest  for  prosperity"  (p.  146).  He 
did  not  have  any  particular  economic  theory  to  guide  him.  Evans  reports  him 
as  saying:  "I  am  a  layman  in  the  field  of  economics.  I  have  made  a  few 
remarks  on  the  subject,  but  all  from  a  political  point  of  view.  For  example 
I  proposed  China's  economic  policy  of  opening  to  the  outside  world,  but  as 
for  the  details  or  specifics  of  how  to  implement  it,  I  know  nothing"  (Evans 
p.  236).  We  also  learn  from  Evans  that  during  one  of  his  periods  of  dis- 
grace  Deng  turned  to  reading  Chinese  history  and  his  speeches  thereafter 
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reflected  this  "education".  It  is  pure  speculation,  but  if  he  did  read  the 
history  of  the  Sung,  could  that  not  have  provided  him  with  the  vision  of  a 
vigorous  China  ruled  by  mandarins  under  an  imperial  dynasty  which  neverthe- 
less  tolerated  a  market  economy  and  the  prosperity  it  begat?  It  would 
reconcile  "the  contradictions  many  outside  China  have  seen  between  Deng 
'readiness  to  experiment  boldly  in  the  economic  sphere  and  his  politica 
conservatism'.  Far  from  seeing  political  liberalization  as  a  necessary 
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condition  for  economic  liberalization,  he  has  seen  it  as  a  serious  potential 
threat  to  social  and  political  stability  and  therefore  to  development" 
(Evans,  p.  219). 
If  Deng's  commitment  to  reforms  (as  long  as  they  are  controlled  by  the 
party)  is  assured,  that  cannot  be  said  of  the  rest  of  the  party.  The 
debates  between  those  who  want  to  return  to  planning  and  those  who  want  to 
go  further  in  economic  liberalization  still  continues,  and  given  the  past 
history  of  the  turns  in  the  roulette  wheel  in  intra  party  disputes,  it  would 30 
be  foolhardy  to  predict  what  the  outcome  will  be  when  Deng  meets  Marx. 
As  in  India  there  are  conflicting  tendencies.  First,  the  sapping  away 
of  both  administrative  and  fiscal  authority  from  the  Centre  has  made  the 
regions  and  their  officials  more  powerful  in  determining  China's  future. 
Those  in  the  South  have  benefitted  personally  from  all  forms  of  effectively 
privatized  enterprise  in  which  they  and  their  relatives  have  become  part- 
ners.  Second,  the  army  (from  all  accounts)  has  also  taken  to  joint  ventures 
and  commerce  in  a  big  way.  These  constitute  important  groups  whose  self- 
interest  must  now  lie  in  continuing  reform.  This  effective  co-option  of 
appartchiks  and  the  army  in  reform,  in  contrast  to  India,  makes  the  commit- 
ment  of  the  political  elite  to  reform  much  more  credible. 
Though  it  may  seem  redundant  to  discuss  any  popular  consensus  about 
.  . 
reform  in  a  dictatorship,  Chinese  history  is  replete  with  examples  where  -- 
whilst  authoritarian  dynastic  rule  has  been  the  norm  --  a  dynasty  could  see 
another  replace  it,  if  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  it  lost  the  Mandate  of 
Heaven!  Here,  as  in  India,  the  dirisgiste  system  established  by  the 
Communists  did  conform  with  atavistic  cultural  attitudes.  It  is  impossible 
to  judge  how  far  the  current  dynasty  and  in  particular  the  reformers  have 
been  tarred  with  the  visible  signs  of  the  blatant  rent-seeking  and  corrup- 
tion  which  has  accompanied  economic  liberalization. 
Finally,  as  regards  competence,  the  Chinese  suffer  from  having  lost  a 
whole  generation  of  youth  to  maleducation  during  the  Cultural  Revolution. 
The  only  technically  sound  economists  are  very  young,  and  though  there  are 
enough  of  them  now  around  the  world,  it  is  difficult  to  judge  whether  they 
can  be  put  together  into  a  team  and  given  their  head,  as  India  has  been  able 
to  do  spectacularly. 31 
Thus  for  slightly  differing  reasons,  but  ultimately  because  of  problems 
concerned  with  politics  and  culture  the  reforms  in  both  China  and  India 
remain  insecure.  So  though,  as  ever,  the  potential  of  the  two  Asian  giants 
remains  immense  if  only  they  could  be  unshackled  from  dirigisme,  it  is  not 
as  yet  certain  that  it  will  be  realized.  My  conclusion  therefore  is  that, 
whilst  a  modest  investment  in  their  emerging  market  funds  is  probably  a 
decent  gamble,  they  do  not  as  yet  provide  for  long  term  foreign  investors, 
nor  their  own  people,  a  certain  road  from  rags  to  riches! 32 
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